Abstract. We assess the factors that affect judgments about the fairness of the distribution of wealth with pooled public opinion data from Latinobarometro surveys conducted in 1997, 2001, and 2002. Hypotheses are tested with a multi-level logit model that allows us to draw on both the individual responses to questions in the surveys, and data about the societies in which they live. At the individual level, we examine the effects of household wealth and class position, and respondents' perceptions of economic circumstances and political conditions. "Country-level" variables include measures of GDP, growth, the degree of inequality, political openness, and access to information. The multi-level model, finally, also allows us to examine the interactions between individual and country-level variables. We find that both individual political perceptions and country-level variables have important substantive effects.
Introduction
"Between a condition of objective inequality and the response of a disadvantaged person," Robert Dahl (1971: 95) has written, "lie the perceptions, evaluations, expectations -in short, the psyche -of the individual." Dahl goes on to warn that political responses to economic inequality will depend on many factors other than the "individual psyche." Even when individuals believe that the distribution of wealth in their country is unjust, they can be deterred from action by skepticism about government capacity, by repression and/or by collective action problems and the lack of political resources. Nevertheless, judgments about the fairness of distribution are likely to play a significant role in decisions to vote for redistribution or to engage in protest against inequality.
In this paper, we assess various hypotheses about the sources of such perceptions with pooled public opinion data from Latinobarometro surveys conducted in 1997, 2001, and 2002. 1 To measure normative assessments of the distribution of wealth (our dependent variable) we use responses to a question which asked whether respondents believed the distribution of wealth in their country was very fair, fair, unfair, very unfair, or if they don't know. Ideally, of course, we would also want to know which reference groups were salient to the respondents (neighbors, elites, etc.) when making their normative judgments about economic inequality, as well as whether they thought the gaps in wealth were increasing or diminishing. Nevertheless, perceptions of unfairness provide a reasonable first approximation of how people judge the existing distribution of wealth.
To analyze the sources of such judgments, we deploy a hierarchical logit model that allows us to examine both the individual responses to questions in the surveys and on data about the societies in which they live. "Individual-level" responses provide information about a respondent's "objective" economic circumstances and her "subjective" perceptions of economic and political conditions. "Country-level" variables include measures of GDP, economic growth, economic inequality, political openness, and access to information. The multi-level model, finally, also allows us to examine the interactions between individual and country-level variables.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The first section reviews some of the theoretical debates about the political effects of economic inequality and the socialpsychological dynamics that underlie them. The second section discusses hypotheses about individual-level and macro-level variables that might affect judgments about inequality. The third and fourth sections lay out our analytic approach and present the results of our statistical estimates. The fifth section concludes.
I. Insights from Literature on Economic Inequality and Redistributive Conflict
The idea that highly unequal societies are prone to intense distributive conflict is a deeply-held belief that goes back at least as far as Aristotle. In fact, however, the evidence about this claim is mixed: there has been -and remains -a lively debate on how and whether economic inequality affects demands for redistribution and undermines political stability. Median voter theory pioneered by Meltzer and Richards (1981) posits that the demand for progressive taxation will vary directly with the difference between average income and the income of the median voter. However, although this theory remains an influential point of departure in some contemporary research (e.g., Boix
2003), its theoretical and empirical foundation has come under criticism. It is widely accepted that voters do not decide on the basis of a simple economic calculus, but are influenced by other preferences, such as religion (Frank 2005; Scheve and Stasavage 2006) , expectations about upward mobility (Benabou and Ok 2001) , and choices offered through the electoral and party system (Lee and Roemer 2008) .
On the other hand, there is also evidence which shows that judgments about the fairness of distribution does play an important role in influencing redistributive demands.
Among the advanced democracies, for example, social spending is relatively low in the United States, where a high percentage of the population attributes unequal outcomes to differences in effort and skill. Social spending is higher in continental Europe, where a much larger percentage of the population attributes income differences to luck or fate (Corneo and Gruner 2002) .
The relation between inequality and more contentious and/or violent forms of political action is also ambiguous. Early work by Russett (1964) , Gurr (1970 ), Tilly (1978 , and Midlarsky (1988) showed evidence of such a relationship, but this view has been challenged in recent decades. Students of contentious politics (McAdam, Tilly, and Tarrow 2001) and analysts of civil wars (Collier and Sambanis 2005, Fearon and Laitin 2003) emphasize variations in resources and opportunities rather than in grievances, and they find no cross-national quantitative evidence that "objective" indicators of inequality, such as the Gini index, make a major difference. Such studies, however, typically examine the motivations of the actors only indirectly.
Despite the evidence to the contrary, moreover, it is difficult to accept as final the conclusion that objections to economic inequality play no systematic role in explaining political instability. Perceptions of distributive injustice lie at the core of many empirically rich qualitative studies of rebellion, dating back to Barrington Moore's (1966) seminal work on peasant revolution, James Scott's (1977) higher levels of economic inequality, in combination with elite-control of immobile assets, are important determinants of the outbreak of civil war. Reenock et al. (2007) find empirical support for their claim that "regressive socioeconomic development" -growth combined with continuing high levels of poverty -is positively linked to political conflict and the breakdown of democracies. Again, however, these studies as well as the previously cited literature on civil war, impute motives to the actors rather than measure them directly.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to enter into the debates about whether and how economic inequality affects political behavior and institutional outcomes. As Dahl suggests, however, an important starting point is an exploration of beliefs about the (in)justice of the existing distribution of wealth. As noted, empirical evidence about the motivational underpinning of protest is missing in much of the formal and quantitative analysis of the effects of inequality.
Our analysis does build a number of other survey-based studies that do address the question of how individuals view inequality. We draw, in particular, on the work of Graham and Sukhtankar (2004) . They find that negative judgments about distribution increase with education and are pronounced among middle-aged respondents, but that individual wealth has no systematic impact. Our analysis also considers hypotheses derived from related studies (Graham and Pettinato 2002; Alessina, Di Tella, and MacColloch 2001) showing that personal happiness can be positively affected by expectations of future improvement -a finding consistent with the "POUM hypothesis"
of Benabou and OK (2001) . The scope of these studies, however, is either limited to the wealthy democracies (Alessina, di Tella, and MacCulloch 2001), or does not directly examine broader societal factors that might influence these attitudes (Graham and Pettinato 2002) .
In this paper, we thus seek to contribute to the literature in two ways. First, as noted, we add to the still limited research on Latin America that actually examines why individuals might view the distribution of wealth as unfair. Second, and perhaps more important, our hierarchical model provides the most statistically appropriate method for examining how such judgments are affected by societal as well as individual factors, and by the interaction between the two.
II. Hypotheses
Our analysis focuses on factors that explain the differences between people who believe that the distribution of wealth is "very unfair" (32.2 percent of the sample) and all other responses. Because Latin America has long been one of the world's most unequal regions, it should not be surprising that another 50.5 percent of the total sample believes the distribution is "unfair," and that only much smaller percentages answer "fair" (11.1), "very fair" (2.9), or "don't know" (3.2 percent). We have run specifications of the models using 3, 4, and 5-point scales, and the pattern of results is strikingly similar to the ones reported here. 2 However, in view of the overwhelmingly negative views of distribution, we believe the dichotomous construction that highlights the "very unfair"
responses is theoretically a more plausible way to capture the judgments of who are especially dissatisfied with the status quo.
As discussed above, we examine the effects of three sets of explanatory factors. First, at the individual level (level 1), we focus on the impact of "objective" circumstances of the respondents and their "subjective" assessments of a variety of economic and political issues. At the country-year level (level 2), we examine the effects of actual levels of economic inequality, democracy, economic growth, wealth, and access to information. Controls for the year of the survey capture very different regional conditions: 1997 was a year of recovery from the region-wide peso crisis, while 2001 and 2002 were generally ones of deep recession. Third, we explore the effects of various cross-level interactions between some of the variables at levels 1 and level 2. We also include a "Level 3" (only a random intercept without any predictors) which controls for unobserved features of individual countries. In the Appendix, we provide the details of how we constructed all of our variables and the descriptive statistics related to them.
Below, we outline our hypotheses.
Individual Level (Level 1) Hypotheses
Objective circumstances. Differences in personal wealth provide a useful starting point for assessing attitudes toward distribution. Although fully developed theories should also consider ethnic or sectoral cleavages, a core assumption in much of the literature is that attitudes divide along the lines of income and wealth (Melzer and Richard 1981; Boix 2003 
Country-Year Level (Level 2) Hypotheses
Including the level 2 variables in our model is important for two reasons. First, it allows us to assess the validity of "subjective" responses to survey questions about their economic and political circumstances. Second, and more important, normative attitudes about inequality can be shaped not only by individuals' personal circumstances and perceptions, but also by the nature of the society in which they live. To assess these possibilities, we include five level 2 variables in our analysis: economic inequality, availability of information, GDP per capita, political openness, and economic growth. GDP per capita. Our expectations with respect to country wealth are ambiguous, for both conceptual and methodological reasons. Theoretically, levels of absolute poverty are generally lower in wealthy countries, and high levels of wealth might therefore mitigate dissatisfaction with inequality. However, country wealth is also highly correlated with aggregate levels of TV ownership, education, and other factors that might lead people to become more dissatisfied. We do not have a clear theoretical way to arbitrate these opposing possibilities; so while we include GDP per capita in Model 6 below, we offer no specific ex ante hypothesis about the extent and direction of the effects. In our cross-level analysis, however, we do explore the possibility that high levels of GDP per capita will increase dissatisfaction among people with relatively low household wealth. .
Political Openness. A level 1 hypothesis discussed above is that people who are critical of the way democracy works in their country might also be inclined to feel that economic distribution is very unfair. However, there are reasons to believe thatindependent of these perceptions -governments that actually function democratically may encourage more favorable judgments. First, there is some evidence that over the long-run, inequality does fall under democratic regimes (Huber et al. 2006) . Moreover, people in democratic systems may be more inclined to tolerate inequality because they believe democracy enhances equality of opportunity. Given this, we hypothesize that:
higher levels of democracy encourage more tolerant views of existing levels of inequality.
Economic growth. The effects of economic growth -like those of GDP per capita -may be more complicated. On the one hand, concerns about relative shares in the national economy might be expected to intensify during periods of low growth and abate during periods of expansion. This suggest a linear effect, and we hypothesize that: the higher the growth in a society, the less likely people are to view distribution as very unfair. On the other hand, many surveys have shown that aggregate levels of unhappiness actually increase in rapidly growing societies. The "paradox of growth," as this finding has been termed, has been attributed to the proposition that rising aspirations for consumption continuously outpace improvements in personal income (Lora 2008 ).
Based on these findings, we also include a hypothesis that posits an inverted U-shaped relationship between judgments about distribution and growth: tolerance for inequality will increase as countries move from low to moderate rates of growth, but will decrease as rates climb from a moderate level to much higher ones.
Cross-Level Hypotheses
To what extent does the larger national context condition the effects of individuallevel variables? We focus on five cross-level hypotheses that relate primarily to the relative deprivation arguments seen in the political conflict literature.
First, we want to know if higher levels of economic inequality in societies increase the chances that poor people will believe that the distribution of wealth is very unfair. Such a claim is implicit in many of the "class conflict" theories of revolution and is at least implicit in the work of Boix (2003) and A&R (2007) . Therefore, we test the following hypothesis: higher levels of economic inequality will increase the inclination of poor individuals to believe that the distribution of income is very unfair.
A second hypothesis, alluded to above, draws on the work of Reenock et al. (2007) . It holds that poor people will be more likely to perceive that economic distribution is unfair when they live in a relatively wealthy society. Poverty may be easier to tolerate when everyone is poor, but much less so when the poor believe they have been left behind. Accordingly, we test the hypothesis that poor individuals living in wealthier countries will be more likely to feel that economic inequality is very unfair.
We also examine the way that economic growth might condition the attitudes of people who have not experienced improvement in their own economic condition and those who are pessimistic about future economic mobility. While high growth may reduce negative judgments among the general public, rapid growth may increase negative judgments among people who lag behind or who believe they are likely to do so in the future (Hirschman and Rothchild 1973) . Again, we test for a non-linear as well as a linear version of this hypothesis, using a dummy variable to distinguish between countries in our sample that grow at relatively moderate rates from those with very low and very high rates of growth.
Finally, we test whether the availability of information conditions the effects of personal wealth on beliefs about inequality. The hypothesis: higher levels of information within a society increase the likelihood that poorer respondents will think that distribution is very unfair.
III. Analytic Method and Models
Our theoretical expectations contain predictions about the effects of societal factors in specific countries that do not vary across all individuals in our data set.
Ignoring the multilevel nature of the data violates the assumption of independent errors, which can lead to the underestimation of the standard errors associated with our contextual variables (Steenbergen and Jones 2002) . The hierarchical, or multi-level, models deployed here not only enable richer analysis but also solve statistical problems that conventional methods confront.
With separate error terms for each country-year intercept, our hierarchical models allow predictors at the three levels to explain variation in judgments about distribution, without assuming that they fully account for such outcomes at each level. Given the nested nature of our data and our dichotomous dependent variable, we estimate our models with a hierarchical generalized linear model (HGLM) that uses a logit link function. We report the results from the unit-specific models (as opposed to population average models) because we are interested in describing how the effects of level 1 and level 2 predictors vary across level 2 units (as opposed to describing such effects for the whole population, which are generated from population-average models. In most of our models, only the intercept is random (random intercept model). For models with a crosslevel interaction term, the individual level variable that is part of the cross-level interaction term is specified as random (random slopes/coefficients model). 4 We use the HLM6.06 software program (Raudenbush et al. 2005 ) to analyze our data.
Our decision to use a multi-level model was also based on our findings from an ANOVA model. In this model, the levels 2 and 3 variance components were highly statistically significant, which indicated that there was systematic variation in perceptions of the distribution of wealth at levels 2 and 3 or that the observations in our data set are not independent of each other and that higher level (macro) factors systematically affect what individuals think about the unfairness of economic inequality.
5 Tables 1 and 2 below present the coefficients and other statistical information from our eight models. We assess how well each model fits the data of successive models by calculating a deviance statistic for each model and determining its statistical significance. 6 These results are presented at the bottom of Tables 1 and 2 . They allow us to compare models against each other to see which ones provide a better relative fit of the data. Most models are better than the one that precede them, and Models 3-8 (fuller models) better fit the data than Models 1 and 2 (simpler models). 4 We set individual level predictors as random in these models because their effects are contingent upon the value of the country-year level predictor with which they are interacted. 5 Using the results from the ANOVA model to calculate rough estimates of the fraction of total variation in our dependent variable explained by our three levels, we find that the fraction explained by level 1 is approximately .93, the fraction explained by level 2 is approximately .03, and the fraction explained by level 3 is approximately .04 (for the formula used to find these numbers, see Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008) . Given that our dependent variable is measured at the individual level, the overwhelmingly large amount of level 1 variance as a proportion of total variation explained is not surprising (Steenbergen and Jones 2002, 231) . 6 The deviance statistic for each model is reported in Tables 1 and 2 below. The deviance statistic is the log likelihood of each model that is multiplied by two; its statistical significance is based on the difference in the deviance statistic between two models being compared, the difference in the their degrees of freedom, and whether or not the difference in the deviance statistic between the two models compared is greater than the chi-square critical value for the difference in their degrees of freedom (at the .05 level). See Snijders and Bosker 1999.
IV. Results
In Tables 1 and 2 percent more likely to believe that distribution is very unfair compared to the wealthiest families. In Model 8, which includes perceptual variables, this falls to only 3 percent.
We obtain similar results when we substitute a dichotomous measure of families in the bottom quintile of the wealth index ("poverty"). The substitution of poverty in Model 1
(not shown) does not produce a significant effect, although the sign of the coefficient is in the expected direction. In Models 5 and 6, the coefficients for poverty are also "correctly" signed (families in the bottom 20 percent are more likely to think distribution is unfair), but they are significant only in Model 6.
Model 2 does provide some support for the hypothesis that the "middle class" is more dissatisfied with distribution than other sectors of the population: the coefficients for wealth and wealth-squared are both significant and go in the expected directions.
These results, however, are not robust to other specifications of the model. Moreover, the effects of dummies for the middle quintiles (4, 5, and 6), and the upper-middle quintiles (8 and 9) do not yield significant results (not shown).
Finally, there is no support for the hypothesis that unemployment leads people to believe that the distribution of wealth is unfair. If anything, the reverse appears to be the case: signs are uniformly negative and are significant in five of the models, indicating that the unemployed are less likely to think distribution is unfair.
Our models do show that negative judgments about distribution are systematically related to higher education and attentiveness to the media. However, people with a high school education are only about 4 percent more likely than illiterates to view the distribution of wealth unfavorably; very frequent viewers of TV news are only about 2 percent more likely to make unfavorable judgments than those who pay the least attention.
Demographic controls. Our findings on the effects of age are consistent with those shown by Graham and Sukhtanker (2004) : the negative and significant coefficient of age-squared, combined with the positive and significant coefficient for age indicates that perceptions of unfairness rise (from 15 to 57 years of age) and decline thereafter. As was the case with the respondents' "objective" economic circumstances, however, the substantive effects are again relatively modest. As Figure 1 shows, individuals who think their needs are not satisfactorily met are about 7 percent more likely than people who are satisfied to hold negative views of wealth distribution.
People who are pessimistic about prospects for upward mobility are about 6 percent more likely to think distribution is very unfair when compared to optimists. Similarly, people who report no improvement in their personal economic situation are 4 percent more likely than those who report improvement to believe distribution is unfair.
Political perceptions, interestingly, generally have larger substantive effects.
People who are dissatisfied with the functioning of democracy are about 9 percent more likely to think distribution is very unfair. The likelihood of such judgments increase by about 10 percent among those who think the law is not effectively implemented and by about 5 percent among those who believe corruption has increased in recent years.
People who place themselves at the far left of the ideological spectrum are about 8 percent more likely to think distribution is very unfair than people on the far right. Perceptions of unfairness also increase with GDP per capita (Model 6), but this is quite plausibly a reflection of TV ownership, which is highly correlated with country wealth.
Country conditions (level 2). Through our multi-level analysis
There is also substantial evidence that people become substantially less concerned about distribution as growth rates increase. Coefficients are consistently significant and in the expected direction, and the substantive effects are again substantial: a person living in the most rapidly growing country (8.1 percent in Argentina, 1997) is about 12 percent less likely to hold a negative judgment than one who lived in the country with the lowest growth (-4.4 percent in Argentina, 2001). We find no support, on the other hand, for the proposition that growth has a curvilinear effect.
Finally, we find no evidence that political openness affects judgments about inequality. While the signs are consistently in the expected direction, they are not statistically significant in any of the models. 7 Due to collinearity with GDP per capita and TV ownership rates, we excluded a level 2 poverty rate measure (from the World Bank's "World Development Indicators" database) in all the models shown above. However, the coefficients for this variable in specifications that did not include GDP per capita and TV ownership were statistically insignificant and wrongly signed. Furthermore, we excluded a level 2 corruption measure (World Bank's "Worldwide Governance Indicators" project) in the models shown above due to the high correlation between it and GDP per capita, TV ownership rates, and Polity scores.
Cross-level interactions. Do societal conditions exacerbate the effects of class position or economic perceptions on judgments about inequality? Results are mixed.
The interaction between household wealth and inequality (Model 5) has the wrong sign and falls short of statistical significance. People from all social classes -not only the poor -tend to object to extremely high concentrations of wealth. Moreover, although the interaction term between household wealth and TV ownership is positive and significant (Model 7), the conditioning effects of access to television are significant only at extremely low levels of ownership.
On the other hand, consistent with the argument of Reenock et al (2007), we do find that poor people who live in relatively wealthy societies are more dissatisfied than those who live in societies with low GDP per capita (Model 6). As Figure 2 shows, for every US$1000 increase in GDP per capita, there is approximately a 5 percent increase in the chances that a poor person will think that distribution is very unfair.
Finally, although we find no evidence to support the hypothesis of a non-linear effect of growth, we do find significant, if somewhat complex, linear effects. Contrary to what might be expected from a relative deprivation argument, economic expansion tends to ameliorate the judgments of those who have not experienced personal improvement (RPEI), or who are pessimistic about mobility (POUM). However, these effects occur primarily at low and moderate rates of growth and taper off afterward.
Figures 3 and 4 provide detail. Among people who are pessimistic about mobility (Figure 3 ), the probabilities of negative judgments decline substantially as growth increases from -4.4 to about 3 percent; within that range, these probabilities decline by
However, in specifications that did not include these three measures, the coefficient for the corruption variable was always negative (in the theoretically right direction), yet never statistically significant. about 10 percent for every 2 percent increase in growth. For the most part, however, the marginal effects disappear when growth exceeds 3 percent, becoming significant again only in countries with exceptionally high rates of 7 or 8 percent. Figure 4 tells a similar story about people who report no recent improvement in their personal economic situation. The probabilities that such people will believe distribution is very unfair declines at growth rates up to about 3 percent, but higher rates of growth have no significant effect.
In short, a change from recession to moderate growth may encourage patience or hope about the long-term, even among people who have neither experienced a personal payoff nor expect one in the near future. 8 But these effects diminish at higher rates of growth, as people adjust their expectations about how the economy is performing.
Judgments about distribution are not necessarily likely to turn more negative, as an inverted U hypothesis would imply. Still, our results do show that high growth cannot be counted on to eliminate the frustrations of people who believe that they are in danger of being left behind.
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V. Conclusions
In this paper, we proceed from the assumption that normative judgments about the distribution of wealth are central to debates about whether and how distributive conflicts influence demands for redistribution and political stability. We acknowledge that the conclusions from our analysis are necessarily limited. We cannot determine from the survey questions whether people believe inequality is increasing, or the points of reference on which they base their judgments. Equally important, our analysis does not
shed light on what might cause individuals to act on the belief that the distribution of wealth is unfair. As noted in the introduction, political protest would almost certainly depend on the availability of resources and the structure of opportunities (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001) . Nor is it clear that beliefs about inequality would translate directly into a choice of redistributive policies in the voting booth.
Despite these limitations, however, we believe our findings contribute to the debate above in a number of ways. First, like most of the survey literature on personal satisfaction, but contrary to many assumptions found in prominent political-economy theories, we find that "objective" class or social position has only a modest impact on an individual's normative judgment about economic inequality. The effects of subjective perceptions about one's personal economic situation are more consistent, but also have only modest substantive effects. Moreover, these cannot clearly be traced back to actual levels of wealth. . Second, our findings point to the significance of political perceptions as a channel through which people evaluate the distribution of wealth within their country. At first glance, it might be considered surprising that the substantive effects of political perceptions are generally larger, than those that focus on economic circumstances.
However, distributive conflicts are invariably played out through political institutions that shape access to political power. Acemoglu and Robinson (2007) argue that elite promises of economic and political concessions will not be credible without corresponding institutional commitments to democracy. In our study, beliefs about distribution were not affected by political openness per se, but people's beliefs about the quality and fairness their country's democracy did make a significant difference. Where people believe that their democracy is working honestly and relatively well, it may also be easier for them to accept relatively high levels of economic inequality as the result of fairer competition on a more level playing field. Conversely, dissatisfaction with inequality intensifies when individuals or groups believe that political institutions are stacked against them (A&R
2006).
Finally, we show that people's judgments about distribution are based not only on their sense of personal wellbeing, but also on the nature of the society in which they live.
Regardless of an individual's objective situation and subjective perceptions, people judge distribution more unfavorably in countries that do in fact have highly skewed distributions of income, as well as in societies where there is greater access to information. Poor people in wealthy societies are more inclined to judge distribution as very unfair -a finding consistent with relative deprivation arguments. Against such arguments, however, growth ameliorates negative judgments among the general public, and -at low to moderate rates -among people who do not receive or expect short-term personal payoffs.
The implications of these judgments for political action is unclear, whether that action involves "normal" democratic behavior such as voting, or broader forms of "noninstitutional" protest against social injustice. Our analysis does, however, raise two important issues. It suggests, on the one hand, the need to problematize the assumption that distributional cleavages will fall along class lines. The emergence of such cleavages will depend not only on opportunities for overcoming barriers to collective action, but also on a realignment of underlying preferences. At the same time, it is also quite clear that concerns about inequality are widespread in Latin America, and that they are based in part on variations in social and economic conditions themselves. Understanding the way such conditions are connected to preferences, political organization, and distributive conflicts remains a major area for continuing research.
APPENDIX
MEASUREMENT OF THE VARIABLES:
Level 1 (individual level) dependent variable Attitudes about the unfairness of the distribution of wealth within one's country:
We use a dichotomous variable that distinguishes between respondents who believe distribution is "very unfair" (category 1) and all other responses (category 0, which includes all the very fair, fair, don't know, and unfair responses). We obtain essentially similar results with alternative model specifications that code these judgments on 3, 4, and 5 point scales.
Level 1 predictors
Wealth: Estimates of household wealth are based on responses to a question about household ownership possession of, or access to, various items, including electrical appliances, computers, camera, telephones, telephone, drinking water, hot water, and sewage. Following McKenzie (2005), Montgomery et al. (2000) , and Vyas and Kumaranayake (2006) , these items are weighted through a principal component analysis and then aggregated into a "wealth index."
Middle-class: This is measured by squaring the wealth index. Alternative measures deploy dummy variables for the 4 th, 5 th , and 6 th quintile, and for quintiles 8 and 9.
Poverty: A dichotomous measure: (1) represents those in poverty and (0) for all those not in poverty. Households in the bottom 20 percent of the wealth index are designated as ones in poverty..
Media Attentiveness: This is measured with the questions: (1) "How many days during the last week did you watch the news on television?" (2) "How many days during the last week did you read a newspaper?" (3) How many days during the last week did you listen to the radio?" The response categories for each question ranges from 0 days -7 days (ordered from low to high). Therefore, this variable ranges from 0 -21.
Retrospective evaluations of personal economic improvement (RPEI):
Based on the question asking whether a respondent's personal economic situation, as well as their family's, is better or worse than 12 months ago; (1) is "much worse;" (2) "about the same;" (3) is "much better."
Prospective evaluations of personal economic upward mobility (POUM):
Based on the question asking respondents what they expect their own personal economic situation, as well as their family's, to be 12 months from now: (1) "much worse;" (2) "about the same;" and (3) "much better."
Personal needs: This is measured with the question that asks respondents whether their salary and their total family income allows them "to satisfactorily cover their needs?" The response categories are coded as follows: (1) "Does not cover them, there are great difficulties;" (2) Does not cover them, there are difficulties;" (3) "Covers them alright, without great difficulty;" (4) "Covers them well, I can save."
Political orientation: Placement on a 10-point left-right scale, with the far right category coded as 11 and the far left category coded as 1. Since approximately 6,000 cases from our dataset are missing values for this variable, we used Stata 8.2 to impute these missing values, based on individual's household wealth, socioeconomic status, education, age, and religiosity.
Perceptions of corruption:
Based on the question that asks respondents whether corruption has increased or not in the past 12 months: (1) corruption has "decreased a lot"; (2) corruption has "decreased a little"; (3) corruption has "remained the same"; (4) corruption has "increased a little"; and (5) corruption has "increased a lot".
Ineffectiveness of the law:
For 1997 and 2001, the question used to measure this variable is based on the question, "how much protection is provided by the labor law in your country? Response categories are: (1) "very protected"; (2) "fairly protected"; (3) "a little protected"; (4) "not at all protected". Since this same question was not included in the 2002 survey, we used a more general question about the effectiveness of the law within countries. The question used to measure this variable was: do citizens (within one's country) "have equal treatment under the law". Response categories for this 2002 survey question (which are very similar to those from the 1997 and 2001 surveys) are: (1) "very" equal treatment; (2) "quite" equal treatment; (3) "a little" equal treatment; and (4) "not at all" equal treatment. Therefore, this variable has 4 categories, ranging from high levels of the effectiveness of the law to low levels of the effectiveness of the law. Models that used data from only the 1997 and 2001 surveys produced results that were essentially the same as the ones presented above.
Dissatisfaction with democracy:
Based on the question that asks respondents how satisfied they are with the way democracy works in their country. Categories are (1.) for those that are very satisfied with democracy; (2.) for those that are satisfied with democracy; (3.) for those that are unsatisfied with democracy; and (4.) for those that are very dissatisfied with democracy.
Level 2 (country-year) predictors 9
Recent economic growth: Annual percentage change in the GDP of a country. Data come from the World Bank.
Political regime openness: Combination of civil and political freedoms. Originally, each dimension ranged from 1 (maximum amount of freedoms) -7 (minimum amount of freedoms). The combined scores were transformed by dividing each by -1 and then adding 14. This allows the variable to range from 0 (least amount of freedom) to 14 (most amount of freedom). Data come from Freedom House.
Economic inequality:
The ratio of the share of the wealthiest decile and the poorest decile in the national income based on household income in the post-government tax and transfer phase. Data comes from the Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean (SEDLAC). An alternative measure was the Gini coefficient, drawn from the UNU (United Nations University) -Wider World Income Inequality Database, which provides coefficients from a variety of reputable sources, including Deininger and Squire (World Bank, 2004 ) and the Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean (2006).
Access to information:
The percentage of people within a country-year that own at least one TV set. Data come from the World Bank. We only used TV data because data on the number of newspapers and/or radios for most country-years were unavailable.
Wealth: GDP per capita (in constant 2000 U.S. dollars) of each country-year. Data comes from the World Bank.
Control Variables
10
Age (level 1): The response categories for this variable are ordered from low to high, with the years of age for a respondent within our dataset comprising each category.
Age Squared (level 1): This is measured by squaring the age variable above. To impute values for this variable, the entire dataset was used in addition to a few other theoretically relevant variables (government social spending, strength of left-leaning parties in the legislature, presence of left-leaning executive, foreign direct investment net flows, % of employed working in agricultural sector, % of exports that come from agricultural sector, and ratio of youth population to total population). Results were robust to models that did not impute missing values. Significance **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** *** **** P< 0.10; ** P< 0.05; *** P< 0.01; **** P< 0.001 Significance **** ** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** P< 0.10; ** P< 0.05; *** P< 0.01; **** P< 0.001 36 At all levels of GDP per capita, there is a positive probability that a poor person will think the distribution of wealth is very unfair. For every increase in GDP per capita by US $1,000, there is approximately a 5% increase in a poor person thinking that the distribution of weal is very unfair. From negative economic growth rates to more moderate (positive) ones, there is a positive probability that a poor person will think that the distribution of wealth is very unfair. For this range, however, every 2% increase in GDP growth leads to an approximately 10% decrease in the probability that a pessimistic POUM person will think that the distribution of wealth is very unfair. Furthermore, in countries with very high economic growth rates (Argentina, 1997), there is a small negative probability that a poor person in such countries will feel that the distribution of wealth is very unfair. From negative economic growth rates to more moderate (positive) ones, there is a positive probability that a poor person will think that the distribution of wealth is very unfair. For this range, however, every 2% increase in GDP growth leads to an approximately 5% decrease in the probability that a person with negative RPEI will think that the distribution of wealth is very unfair. 
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